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Abstract
In the first part of the thesis, a generalized version of the Tomographic Quantum Key Dis-
tribution protocol in which the two users Alice and Bob share a Bell diagonal mixed state
of two qubits will be presented and its security analyzed. In particular, it will be shown
that if an eavesdropper performs a coherent measurement on a number of ancilla states si-
multaneously, classical methods of secure key distillation are less effective than quantum
distillation protocols. Furthermore, certain classes of Bell diagonal states that are resistant
to eavesdropping attacks will be identified.
In the second part of this thesis, the security of the tomographic protocol using a source
which produces entangled photons via an experimental scheme proposed in Phys. Rev. Lett.,
92, 37903 (2004) will be analyzed. The range of experimental parameters for which the
protocol is secure will be determined.
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The main goal of quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution (QKD), is the estab-
lishment of a random, secure and perfectly correlated set of key between the two users Alice
and Bob. The laws of quantum mechanics are exploited to achieve this purpose. In essence,
Alice and Bob make use of entanglement and perform suitable measurements to generate
random sets of keys for themselves. In the absence of interference from the environment,
these two sets of keys for Alice and Bob will be perfectly correlated. Moreover, by making
use of the no-cloning theorem [Wootters and Zurek, 1982], Alice and Bob can make sure
that any attempt at eavesdropping can be detected so that they can always be certain about
the security of their keys. The first QKD protocol was discovered by Bennett and Bras-
sard in 1984 [Bennett and Brassard, 1984], and since then, a number of others have been
proposed, such as the Ekert91 [Ekert, 1991], the B92 [Bennett, 1992] and in particular, the
Tomographic Quantum Key Distribution scheme proposed by Liang et al. [Liang et al.,
2003]. Experimentally, the field of QKD is sufficiently advanced so that there is already the
possibility for commercialization of some of the QKD devices.
1.1 Overview
This thesis will consist of two parts. In the first part, the Tomographic QKD protocol will
be presented and extended to a generalized scheme in which Alice and Bob share a Bell
diagonal mixed state of two qubits. The security of the protocol will be analyzed based
on the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner (CK) theorem which guarantees that a secure key can be established
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through classical communication and one-way error-correcting codes if the correlations be-
tween Alice and Bob’s data are stronger than that between the eavesdropper Eve and either
one of them.
Two scenarios will be considered. In the first scenario, Alice and Bob agree on a crypto-
graphic key if the correlations between their data are stronger than that between Eve and
one of them, under the assumption that Eve can only perform incoherent measurements.
The CK theorem then guarantees a way of generating a secure key. In the second scenario,
we consider the situation when Eve’s correlations are initially stronger than Alice and Bob’s
so that the CK theorem is no longer valid. In this case, Alice and Bob can perform an inter-
mediate step known as distillation to strengthen their correlation with respect to Eve’s, and
in doing so, make the CK theorem applicable once more. Two distillation protocols will be
considered: a classical method known as Advantage Distillation (AD) and a quantum pro-
cedure known as Entanglement Distillation (ED). The security of the Tomographic QKD
protocol under these two distillation procedures will be considered, and in particular it will
be shown that if Eve performs coherent measurements, the classical method of key distil-
lation is less effective than the quantum method. Finally, it will be shown that there exist
certain classes of Bell diagonal states which are resistant to any attempt at eavesdropping.
In the second part of the thesis, the security of QKD protocols based on a particular scheme
of generating polarization-entangled photons from a quantum dot single photon source will
be considered. Such a method of producing entangled photons was first proposed by Fattal
et al. [Fattal et al., 2004] and can be incorporated into QKD schemes based on shared
entanglement, such as the Ekert91 and BBM92 [Bennett et al., 1992]. The security of
the Tomographic QKD protocol based on such a source of photons will be analyzed in
particular. The range of experimental parameters for which the protocol is secure against
incoherent attacks will be determined in the analysis and certain observations which could
also be applied to other QKD schemes will be made.





Distribution with Bell Diagonal
States
In this chapter, the Tomographic QKD scheme based on Bell diagonal states will be pre-
sented. The protocol will first be described in general, after which we will apply the scheme
to Bell diagonal states. We will then consider the situation where there is there is an eaves-
dropper Eve in the channel. Her optimal eavesdropping strategy in the situation where she
is restricted only to incoherent attacks will be described, and the conditions for the protocol
to be secure will be derived based on the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner theorem.
2.1 Protocol
In the Tomographic QKD proocol [Liang et al., 2003], a central source distributes entangled
qubit pairs to Alice and Bob (Fig. 2.1). For each qubit that they receive, Alice and Bob will
independently and randomly choose one of the three Pauli observables {σx, σy, σz} to mea-
sure their qubits. These observables have the important property of being tomographically
complete in the sense that the probabilities for finding their eigenvalues as the results of
measurements uniquely specify the statistical operator of the qubit pairs (see Appendix A).
For each measurement they perform, Alice and Bob will separately record down the observ-
ables they have chosen as well as the results obtained.
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Figure 2.1: Tomographic QKD setup. A central source distributes entangled qubit pairs
described by density operator % to Alice and Bob. For each qubit that they receive, Alice
and Bob will independently and randomly choose one of the three tomograpically complete
Pauli observables {σx, σy, σz} to measure their qubits. After each measurement, Alice and
Bob will keep separate records of the observables they have chosen as well as the results
obtained. Here, the three Pauli matrices are expressed in the z basis.
In the ideal situation, Alice and Bob expect to receive the maximally entangled singlet state
|ψ−〉 from the source:
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|z0, z1〉 − |z1, z0〉) . (2.1)
Here, we have expressed Alice and Bob’s two-qubit state in the z basis. The first ket entry
refers to Alice’s qubit while the second refers to Bob’s qubit. If we express Eq. (2.1) in
the other two bases, we see that the singlet state is invariant (up to a global phase) in those
bases:
|ψ−〉 = − 1√
2




(|y0, y1〉 − |y1, y0〉) . (2.2)
After all the qubits have been transmitted by the source and measured, Alice and Bob will
proceed to the second step of the protocol where they process their data in the following
way: They will first announce, over a public but authenticated channel, the observables
they have measured for each qubit they receive. The results of the measurement are kept
secret however. Based on this announcement, Alice and Bob will then proceed to divide
their respective data into two groups. In the first group would be those results for which
they have chosen the same observable to measure the same qubit pair, while in the second
group would be those results for which they have chosen different observables.
4
For the first group, Alice and Bob’s results will always be perfectly anticorrelated as well
as random. For example, the probabilities for measurements performed in the x basis are










Here p(AB)kl|mm′ denotes the probability of Alice and Bob obtaining outcomes ‘k’ and ‘l’ re-
spectively, given that they measured the observables σm and σm′ (where m,m′ = x, y or
z) respectively. The data from this first group of matching bases can thus be used as a valid
cryptographic key.
The second group of results for non-matching bases does not possess any useful correlations
and is not useful for key generation. For example, we have
p(AB)kl|xy = Tr [|xk, yl〉〈xk, yl|ψ−〉〈ψ−|] =
1
4
, for all k, l = 0, 1. (2.4)
The results from this group of data are not completely useless however. What Alice and Bob
will do in the next stage of the protocol is to make use of this group of data, together with
some of the data from the first group, to perform a state tomography on the source. In this
verification stage, Alice and Bob will exchange their data from the two groups and consider
the frequencies at which various results arise. By doing this, they can in principle recon-
struct any density operator describing the two-qubit state that they share (see Appendix A).
If this reconstructed state is not of the form |ψ−〉〈ψ−| that they expect from the source, they
will consider the channel insecure; they will discard their data and use another channel that
fulfills their tomography requirement.
The tomographic protocol is summarized in Fig. 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Tomographic QKD protocol.
2.1.1 Eavesdropping in a Perfect Channel
Suppose we have an eavesdropper Eve in the channel. It will be shown that the protocol
will always be secure in the ideal situation of a noiseless channel, for which Alice and
Bob always receive the singlet state |ψ−〉 from the source. To be on the safe side, one
must assume that Eve has full knowledge of the cryptographic protocol (the “Kerckhoff
principle” of cryptology), and that she acquires as much knowledge about Alice and Bob’s
communication as is allowed by the laws of physics. In particular, it will be assumed that
Eve has full control of the qubit distributing source.
In order to obtain as much information as possible about the key generated by Alice and
Bob, Eve entangles their qubits with ancilla states |eab〉 in her possession. The most general
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state she can prepare∗† is
|ψABE〉 = |φ+〉|e00〉+ |φ−〉|e01〉+ |ψ+〉|e10〉+ |ψ−〉|e11〉, (2.5)
where we have represented each of the four Bell states in the following way:
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|z0, z0〉 ± |z1, z1〉)
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|z0, z1〉 ± |z1, z0〉) . (2.6)
Because Alice and Bob perform state tomography to ensure that their two-qubit state is
always in a singlet state, Eve will also have to make sure that her prepared state appears to
Alice and Bob in that form, that is we require that on tracing out Eve’s degree of freedom
in |ψABE〉〈ψABE |, we recover the pure singlet state |ψ−〉〈ψ−|:
TrE [|ψABE〉〈ψABE |] = |ψ−〉〈ψ−|. (2.7)
Here, TrE [·] denotes taking a partial trace over Eve’s ancilla space. This tomography re-
quirement imposes the following structure on Eve’s ancillas:
〈e00|e00〉 = 〈e01|e01〉 = 〈e10|e10〉 = 0
〈e11|e11〉 = 1, (2.8)
so that Eve is effectively restricted to the following preparation:
|ψABE〉 = |ψ−〉|e11〉. (2.9)
The only state that Eve can prepare is separable and there is no useful entanglement between
her ancillas and the qubit pairs that can provide her information about Alice and Bob’s
measurements. Eve will not be able to obtain any useful information from her ancillas in
this ideal noiseless scenario and the protocol is secure.
∗Since there is no advantage in generating a mixed state, it is sufficient to consider only such pure state
preparations.
†More generally, one could consider coherent attacks in which Eve prepares entangled multi-qubit pair
states rather than the single qubit pair state of Eq. (2.5). There would then be correlations appearing between
different qubit pairs. We shall take for granted that Alice and Bob protect themselves by also looking for such
correlations when they exchange information during state tomography, thus ruling out such a class of coherent
attack.
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2.2 Tomographic QKD with Bell Diagonal States
Although the Tomographic QKD protocol is perfectly secure in the noiseless situation, Al-
ice and Bob cannot expect to obtain the pure singlet state |ψ−〉〈ψ−| in realistic situations
because either the the source is not ideal, there is interference with the surroundings, or
there is an eavesdropper tampering with the system. Their two-qubit state will be a mixed
state in general.
Suppose now that Alice and Bob’s QKD setup is non-ideal, so that instead of a pure singlet





Following the nomenclature of [Bennett et al., 1996], each of the four Bell states in the z






where ω = −1 and addition in the indices is performed modulo 2. We note that each Bell
state is uniquely represented by two indices: an amplitude bit a which gives the parity of the
two qubits (0 for even parity, 1 for odd) and a phase bit b (0 for ‘+’ phase, 1 for ‘-’ phase).




|z11〉 ≡ |ψ−〉. (2.12)
In Eq. (2.10), pab represents the proportion of the Bell state |zab〉 and they sum to 1,∑1
a,b=0 pab = 1. The ideal situation for which Alice and Bob receive the pure singlet
state |z11〉 corresponds to the case where p11 = 1. Furthermore, we require one of the
probabilities pab to be greater than 12 as otherwise the two-qubit state Eq. (2.10) becomes
separable and Alice and Bob will not be able to obtain a secure key from such a state (see
8
Chapter 3). Without loss of generality, it will be assumed here that p11 > 12 . The protocol
for this mixed state scenario then proceeds as before and in the tomography stage of the pro-
tocol, Alice and Bob will accept their measurement data if and only if their reconstructed
state is in the Bell diagonal form.
We note that the state
∑1
a,b=0 pab|zab〉〈zab| can be obtained from the singlet state |z11〉〈z11|
by assuming that the travelling qubits undergo random bit and phase flips. The so-called
Werner state (maximally entangled state admixed with white noise) is a special case where
we have p00 = p01 = p10 = 1−p113 . The Bell diagonal state considered here is thus more
general than the one studied in [Liang et al., 2003; Brußet al., 2003] where only Werner
states were considered.
It is convenient to express the state Eq. (2.10) in the x and y bases as well. This can be done
by noting the transformation rules on the Bell states:
|zab〉 = (−i)aωab|ya+b+1 a〉 = ωab|xba〉. (2.13)











If we have a Bell diagonal state in one of the bases, it will remain Bell diagonal in the other
two bases.
If we compute the probability of Alice and Bob obtaining anticorrelated results in the event





Tr [|zk, zk+1〉〈zk, zk+1|%]
= p10 + p11 ≡ p(z)1 ,
p(anticorrelation|y basis) = p00 + p11 ≡ p(y)1 ,
p(anticorrelation|x basis) = p01 + p11 ≡ p(x)1 . (2.15)
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Tr [|zk, zk〉〈zk, zk|%]
= p00 + p01 ≡ p(z)0 ,
p(correlation|y basis) = p01 + p10 ≡ p(y)0 ,
p(correlation|x basis) = p00 + p10 ≡ p(x)0 . (2.16)
Since p11 > 12 , we see that Alice and Bob are more likely to obtain anticorrelated results in
whichever basis they measure; they will thus make use of anticorrelation to generate their
key sequence.
2.2.1 Eavesdropping
Let us now consider the security of the tomographic protocol based on Bell diagonal states.
Unlike the ideal situation, the protocol will in general not always be secure as Eve can
obtain some information about the key that Alice and Bob have established. However, by
determining the values of the pab’s from state tomography, Alice and Bob can place an
upper bound on the knowledge that Eve has about their key. The Csisza´r-Ko¨rner theorem
then guarantees them of a secure key that can be extracted from their raw key as long as
their correlations are stronger than than that between Eve and either one of them. To place
this upper bound on Eve’s knowledge, we shall assume the worst-case scenario in which
Eve has full control of the source and that all imperfections in the channel are due to her
eavesdropping activities.
Ancilla Structure








To satisfy the tomography requirement of the protocol, Eve has to prepare the entangled
state in such a way that it appears Bell diagonal to Alice and Bob, ie. if we trace out Eve’s
degree of freedom, we must recover a two-qubit state that is Bell diagonal. This imposes
the following structure on Eve’s ancillas:
〈ea′b′ |eab〉 = δa′,aδb′,b. (2.18)






































































Here, the various probabilities p(m)a in the mth basis (m = x, y, z) are given by Eqs. (2.15)
and (2.16), and each ancilla |fmak〉 has been characterized using two indices: a parity index
a which gives the parity of the two-qubit state it is attached to, and an index k giving the
11
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≡ λ(x)a , (2.22)
while ancilla states with different a’s are orthogonal.
Based on this structure, we can divide Eve’s ancillas |fmak〉 in each basis m into two groups
according to the parity bit a. The first group corresponds to a = 0 and refers to the situation
when Alice and Bob obtain correlated results in the mth basis. The second group corre-
sponds to the case a = 1, for which Alice and Bob obtain anticorrelated results. The a = 0
group occurs with probability p(m)0 while the a = 1 group occurs with probability p
(m)
1 . The
ancillas in the a = 0 group are orthogonal to those in the a = 1 group. Within each group
however, the ancillas with different k’s are non-orthogonal in general and have mutual in-
ner product 〈fma0|fma1〉 = λ(m)a . The structure of the ancillas is summarized graphically in
Fig. 2.3.
2.2.2 General Strategy
Eve’s strategy is as follows. She will wait for Alice and Bob to perform their measurement
and announce their measurement bases as well as the qubits they intend to use for key











Figure 2.3: Structure of the ancillas |fmak〉 in the mth basis. Ancillas with different parity bit
a reside in orthogonal subspaces. Within each subspace, ancillas with different values of k
have inner product λ(m)a and are in general nonorthogonal.
Eve can identify the qubit pairs as well as the measurement bases in which to perform her
attack. Her ancilla corresponding to each of those contributing pairs will then be a mixture
of four possible states:








where m = x, y, z is the chosen basis of Alice and Bob and TrAB [·] denotes taking partial
trace over Alice and Bob’s degrees of freedom. Formally, this can be viewed as a trans-
mission of information from Alice and Bob to Eve, with the information encoded in the
quantum state %mE of Eve’s ancilla. Eve’s optimal eavesdropping strategy is then to maxi-
mize this information transfer by choosing a suitable generalized measurement, known as a
Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM), to perform on her ancilla. A brief discussion
of POVMs and their properties is given in Appendix B.
Another way to understand this transfer of information from Alice and Bob to Eve is as












while Alice and Bob’s two-qubit state is given by








When Alice and Bob measure their respective qubits, they will collapse Eve’s ancilla space
into an appropriate state. For those qubit pairs that contribute to key generation, the col-
lapsed state will be one of the |fmak〉’s, where m is the chosen basis. Specifically, if Alice
and Bob measure k and k + a respectively, Eve’s collapsed state will be |fmak〉. This oc-
curs with probability 〈mk,mk+a|%mAB|mk,mk+a〉 = p
(m)
a
2 . By determining the identity
of this collapsed state, Eve will be able to deduce Alice and Bob’s measurement results.







2 |fmak〉〈fmak| to Eve whose goal is to extract the maximum information
possible from this mixed state to help her determine Alice and Bob’s measurement results.
This maximum amount of information available to Eve is also known in literature as the
accessible information [Nielsen and Chuang, 2000].
2.2.3 Incoherent Attack
We shall assume that Eve carries out an incoherent attack in which she measures her ancillas
one at a time. In contrast, in a coherent attack, she would measure some joint observable of
more than one ancilla at a time, or construct Eq. (2.20) so that more than one pair of qubits
are entangled with each ancilla‡. We shall give an example of how Eve can carry out the
first type of coherent attack later on in Chapter 4.















‡As pointed out before, we assume that Alice and Bob protect themselves from this second possibility by










describes Eve’s ancilla in the situation where Alice and Bob obtain correlated results in the








describes her state for anticorrelated results, which occurs with probability p(m)1 . Since ρm0
and ρm1 reside in orthogonal subspaces, Eve can discriminate between the two situations
unambiguously.
The POVM measurement that optimizes the information transferred by Alice and Bob to
Eve via the state %mE will now be presented. The proof of optimality is given in Appendix C.
Optimal POVM
In the first step of the measurement, Eve projects her mixture of ancillas into one of the two
orthogonal subspaces corresponding to the parity index a. The subspace that she projects
into depends on the result of Alice and Bob’s measurement. If Alice and Bob obtain corre-
lated results, Eve will project into the a = 0 subspace and end up with the mixed state ρm0 ;
if they obtain anticorrelated results, she projects into the a = 1 subspace instead and ends
up with ρm1 .
Next, she applies the measurement that maximizes the information she can extract from the
mixed state ρma obtained in the first step. Now, ρma is composed of an equiprobable mixture








which is an equal mixture of the pure states |fx00〉 and |fx01〉. The optimum measurement
which maximizes the information she can extract from such a mixture is known in literature
and is given by the so-called square-root measurement [Chefles, 2000a; Helstrom, 1976].
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Square-Root Measurement





in fact the one that minimizes Eve’s error in distinguishing between the two nonorthogonal






Given a state |fmak〉 in the mth basis, the probability of inferring it correctly using the square-
root measurement is then given by
p(ωmak|fmak) = Tr [|ωmak〉〈ωmak|fmak〉〈fmak|]
= |〈fmak|ωmak〉|2 ≡ η(m)a . (2.31)
The probability of a wrong guess is 1− η(m)a .
For the purpose of obtaining the probability in Eq. (2.31), we note that ρma has the eigenkets




(|fma0〉+ |fma1〉) and |sma 〉 = 1√
2(1−λ(m)a )
(|fma0〉 − |fma1〉), with corre-












|sma 〉〈sma |. (2.32)




〈fmak|sma 〉 = (δk,0 − δk,1)
√




















Figure 2.4: Geometrical interpretation of the square-root measurement.










Eq. (2.35) tells us that if Eve’s ancillas |fma0〉 and |fma1〉 are orthogonal (λ(m)a = 0), she
can distinguish them without error (η(m)a = 1); if her ancillas are parallel/antiparallel
(λ(m)a = ±1), and hence indistinguishable, the best she can do is to resort to random guess-
ing (η(m)a = 12 ). These results are what we would expect intuitively.
We note that the square-root measurement has the following geometrical interpretation
which we will find useful later on: Suppose we picture the two ancillas |fma0〉 and |fma1〉
being aligned at an angle of cos−1 λ(m)a . The square-root measurement will then be a pro-
jective measurement whose projected states |ωma0〉 and |ωma1〉 are orthogonal to each other
(ie. a von Neumann measurement) and have geometrical relations with the ancilla states as
shown in Fig. 2.4. We can then express the ancilla states in terms of the square-root states
as follows:
|fma0〉 = cosα|ωma0〉+ sinα|ωma1〉
|fma1〉 = sinα|ωma0〉+ cosα|ωma1〉. (2.36)











The probability of inferring a state correctly is then given by the probability of projecting














For the purpose of determining the criteria for security, we summarize the probabilities
of Alice, Bob and Eve getting the various results. Since Alice and Bob generate their
cryptographic key only if their bases match, we shall consider only the situation where
Alice and Bob have matching bases.














The probability of Alice measuring k and Eve getting outcome ωmal for the square-root














The corresponding probability for Bob and Eve, p(BE)
k,al|basis m, has a similar expression.
2.2.4 Security Criterion
Let us now derive the conditions for which our protocol is secure under an incoherent eaves-
dropping attack.
Intuitively, Alice and Bob are able to obtain a secure key if the information that they share
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in terms of their bit correlation is greater than the information that Eve can obtain from
them via her ancillas. A quantitative measure of the information shared between two par-
ties is given by the so-called mutual information [Cover and Thomas, 1991]. The mutual





















k,l are the respective marginals. The mutual informa-
tion is non-negative. It is 0 when Alice and Bob’s outcomes are independent (p(AB)k,l = p(A)k p(B)l )
and has a maximum value when Alice and Bob’s outcomes are perfectly correlated. In the
case of binary outcomes (k, l = 0, 1), IAB has a maximum value of 1 for perfect correla-
tion. Appendix D gives an intuitive argument as to why the mutual information can be used
to quantify the amount of correlation between two ensembles.
Using the expression for Alice and Bob’s joint probability in Eq. (2.39), we can compute
the mutual information between Alice and Bob’s data established in the mth basis. Doing
so, we obtain the following:
I(m)AB = 1 + p(m)0 log2 p(m)0 + p(m)1 log2 p(m)1
= 1−H(p(m)0 ). (2.42)
We have expressed the final expression more conveniently in terms of the binary entropy,
defined as H(p) = −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2 (1− p). The entropy gives an indication of
how random the events are in a probability distribution [Cover and Thomas, 1991]. In the
case of binary probability distributions, the binary entropy H(p) has a maximum of 1 when
p = 12 (all events are equiprobable), and a minimum of 0 when p = 0 or 1 (one of the events
always occurs).
Likewise, the mutual information between Alice and Eve in the mth basis computed using








Due to the symmetric nature of the quantum channel, the mutual information between Bob
and Eve, I(m)BE , is the same as that between Alice and Eve.
Csisza´r-Ko¨rner Theorem
The condition for the tomographic protocol to be secure is given by the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
(CK) theorem [Csisza´r and Ko¨rner, 1978] which says that Alice and Bob can generate a
secure key from their raw key sequence by means of a suitably chosen error-correcting code
and classical two-way communication if the mutual information between them exceeds that
between Eve and either one of them, i.e. security is assured as long as we are in the following
CK regime:
IAB > {IAE , IBE}. (2.44)
Note that due to the symmetric nature of the protocol, we have IAE = IBE . Furthermore,
the CK yield is given by
ν = max{IAB − IAE , 0} (2.45)
and it defines the rate at which a secure key can be generated in the CK theorem: a secure
key of length νL can be obtained from a raw key sequence of length L by applying the CK
theorem.
Now for each basis m = x, y or z, we can define a corresponding CK yield for the rate at
which a secure key can be generated using the data measured in that basis alone:
νm = max{I(m)AB − I(m)AE , 0}. (2.46)
The yield for different bases will in general be different. It will be assumed here that Alice
and Bob make use of data only from those bases that give them positive yield to establish
their key while rejecting the data obtained from the remaining bases that give them zero
20












A Bell diagonal density matrix is characterized by four probabilities {p00, p01, p10, p11}
together with the normalization condition p00 + p01 + p10 + p11 = 1, so that only three of
the probabilities are independent. Let us thus parameterize the probabilities using p11 (the
proportion of |z11〉 in the Bell mixture) and two angles θ, φ in the following way:
p00 = (1− p11) cos2 θ cos2 φ
p01 = (1− p11) sin2 θ cos2 φ
p10 = (1− p11) sin2 φ. (2.48)
By considering the average yield ν over different values of p11, θ and φ, we can determine
those states for which the protocol is secure (the CK regime): these states have ν > 0 so
that a secure key can be extracted from them using the CK theorem. In Fig. 2.5, the CK
regime for fixed p11 is shown over all possible values of θ and φ.
First, we note that as long as p11 & 0.765, all Bell diagonal states will be secure. When
p11 drops below this threshold, insecure states will start to appear. In fact, the first insecure
state that appears is the Werner state 4p11−13 |z11〉〈z11| + 1−p113 1 ⊗ 1. The Werner state
was considered in the protocol of [Liang et al., 2003] and the same threshold of 0.765 was
obtained. As p11 decreases further, fewer and fewer states remain secure until finally when
we reach p11 = 12 , the Bell diagonal mixture becomes separable (see Chapter 3) and no
secret bits can be obtained.
¶From their state tomography, Alice and Bob can determine the parameters pab and can thus agree before-
hand on those bases which will give them positive yield.
21
Resistant States
From the figures, we can also identify certain states that remain secure against incoherent
attacks as long as p11 > 12 . These resistant states are the rank 2 states, given by
‘00’ resistant state: (1− p11)|z00〉〈z00|+ p11|z11〉〈z11| (for which θ = 0, φ = 0);
‘01’ resistant state: (1− p11)|z01〉〈z01|+ p11|z11〉〈z11| (θ = pi2 , φ = 0);
‘10’ resistant state: (1− p11)|z10〉〈z10|+ p11|z11〉〈z11| (φ = pi2 ). (2.49)
For these rank 2 states, it can be shown that there are certain bases for which Eve is not able
to extract any useful information from her ancilla. For example, consider the ‘00’ resistant
state. The ancilla structure in the different bases are:
|〈fz00|fz01〉| = 1 , |〈fz10|fz11〉| = 1
|〈fy00|fy01〉| = 1 , |〈fy10|fy11〉| = 2p11 − 1
|〈fx00|fx01〉| = 1 , |〈fx10|fx11〉| = 1. (2.50)
Hence for the x and z bases, Eve will not be able to distinguish between the ancilla states
with different k values lying in the same a subspace. It follows that for the ‘00’ resistant
state, if Alice and Bob only use data from the x and z bases to generate the key, Eve cannot
extract any useful information about their key from her ancilla‖. In this sense, the ‘00’
state provides not just security against incoherent attacks, but unconditional security as it
remains secure against any attack that Eve performs. Similarly for the ‘01’ resistant state,
we have unconditional security in the y and z bases, while for the ‘10’ resistant state, we
have unconditional security in the x and y bases.
‖This is because Eve knows only the parity index a characterizing Alice and Bob’s measurement but she
is not able to determine the index k corresponding to Alice’s result — both indices are needed to deduce both























































































































































































































Based on the CK theorem, we can determine those Bell diagonal states which would give
Alice and Bob a secure set of key. If there is too much noise in the channel however,
it is possible for Eve to extract enough information from her ancilla so that her mutual
information is higher than that between Alice and Bob. In this case, the CK theorem is not
immediately applicable in obtaining a secure key. However, Alice and Bob may perform
auxiliary steps so as to strengthen the correlation between their keys in order for the CK
theorem to be applicable again. This procedure is known as distillation and will be the
subject of the next two chapters. In general, Alice and Bob can opt to perform classical
distillation whereby they select a subsequence of their established bit values in a systematic
way, or carry out quantum distillation in which they pre-process their two-qubit state before
measuring. We will apply both methods of distillation to the tomographic protocol and




In the quantum method of distillation known as Entanglement Distillation (ED), Alice and
Bob produce a smaller number of more strongly entangled qubit pairs from weakly en-
tangled ones by means of local operations and classical communication [Deutsch et al.,
1996; Alber et al., 2001]. In this chapter, the ED protocol will be described and the condi-
tion for the procedure to be successful in generating a secure key for Alice and Bob will be
obtained.
3.1 ED Protocol
Suppose Alice and Bob initially share a large number n of qubit pairs sent from the source,
each pair being in the same Bell diagonal state %, so that the total state is %⊗n. The pro-
portion of the singlet state |z11〉 present in each state % (ie. the singlet fraction) is given by
〈z11|%|z11〉 = p11. Their aim is to obtain a smaller number of pairs %˜⊗m (m < n) with a
higher proportion of singlet fraction, 〈z11|%˜|z11〉 > p11. To achieve this, Alice and Bob can
carry out the following sequence of steps iteratively on their qubit pairs:
1. They pick two pairs, apply to each of them U ⊗ U∗ twirling, ie. random unitary
transformation of the form U ⊗ U∗: Alice picks at random a unitary transformation
U , applies it, and communicates to Bob which transformation she chooses; Bob will





Figure 3.1: Bilateral quantum XOR operation.
state %′ whose singlet fraction remains unchanged:
%⊗ % −→ %′ ⊗ %′.
2. Each party performs unitary XOR on their respective qubits (see Fig. 3.1). The trans-









The first qubit is called the source qubit and the second one is the target qubit. They
will obtain some complicated state %ˆ after the operation.
3. Alice and Bob then perform a local measurement on their respective target qubits in
the {|z0〉, |z1〉} basis. They communicate the results of their measurement and if they
obtain the same outcome, they will keep the source pair. The final state of the kept
source pair is given by
%˜ =
1
N TrHt [Pt ⊗ 1s%ˆPt ⊗ 1s] , (3.1)
where the partial trace is perform over the Hilbert space Ht of the target pair, 1s is
the identity on the space of the source pair (since it is not measured), while Pt =
|z0, z0〉〈z0, z0| + |z1, z1〉〈z1, z1| acts on the target pair space and corresponds to the
case where Alice and Bob’s results agree. The normalization constant N is given by
Tr [Pt ⊗ 1s%ˆPt ⊗ 1s]. On the other hand, if the results of Alice and Bob’s measure-
ment disagree, the source pair is discarded.
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It can be shown [Alber et al., 2001] that as long as the initial two-qubit state % is entangled,
Alice and Bob’s distilled state %˜ will have a higher singlet fraction than before. They may
then apply the distillation procedure to the surviving distilled states again to obtain states
with higher singlet fraction, and so on. Hence, by applying the protocol repeatedly to every
surviving qubit pair, Alice and Bob can eventually drive the singlet fraction to 1 so that each
of the surviving two-qubit states must individually approach the pure state |z11〉〈z11|.
3.1.1 Peres-Horodecki Criterion
As pointed out earlier, the ED protocol will be successful as long as the initial pair of qubits
are entangled. In the case of qubits, such a condition can also be expressed by the Peres-
Horodecki Partial Transposition criterion [Peres, 1996]: A two-qubit state % is quantum dis-
tillable if and only if it is a non-positive partial transposed (NPPT) state. A state % is NPPT
if %TB  0 so that it has at least one negative eigenvalue. Here, %TB denotes partial transpo-
sition of % with respect to Bob’s basis only, ie. % =
∑1




k,l,m,n=0 ρkl,mn|zk, zn〉〈zm, zl|.




− |za+1 b+1〉〈za+1 b+1|. (3.2)
















. Applying the Peres-Horodecki criterion,







As is evident from the nature of the ED protocol, this threshold is independent of the kind
of eavesdropping attack Eve performs on the quantum channel.
The Peres-Horodecki criterion also gives the condition for a quantum state to be separable:
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a state which is non-NPPT is separable. In our case, if maxab pab ≯ 12 , Alice and Bob’s






i ⊗ %(B)i . (3.5)
Eve can then blend the state % from product states by sending each product state %(A)i ⊗%(B)i
to Alice and Bob respectively with probability pi, and by doing so, ensure that no useful
mutual information between Alice and Bob can be established for them to generate a secure
key. This observation motivates us to require at least one of the pab’s in Eq. (2.10) to be
more than 12 in the protocol.
The ED procedure presented here is rather wasteful in terms of discarded particles – at least
half of the particles (those used as targets) are lost at every iteration. In the next chapter, we
shall look at another distillation method available for Alice and Bob — a classical method
of post-selecting their measured bit values and processing them via two-way communica-
tion to obtain a distilled key sequence with stronger correlations. The classical method of
distillation can be more attractive than ED by nature of its simplicity. There are quite a
number of classical distillation methods, such as the parity-check procedure discussed in
[Kaszlikowski et al., 2004]. We will be considering a protocol known as Advantage Dis-





In Classical Advantage Distillation (AD) Alice and Bob process their bit values by means
of classical two-way communication to obtain a distilled key sequence possessing stronger
correlations. In this chapter, the AD protocol will be described, after which the condition
for the protocol to be successful will be derived.
Earlier, we have applied Quantum Entanglement Distillation to the tomographic protocol
and derived conditions for distillation to be successful. An important question that naturally
arises is whether quantum methods of distillation are equivalent to classical ones in the sense
that both offer the same amount of security. It will be shown at the end of this chapter that if
an eavesdropper performs a coherent measurement on many quantum states simultaneously,
classical methods of distillation are less effective than quantum ones. The same conclusion
was obtained in [Kaszlikowski et al., 2003].
4.1 Protocol
We noted in Chapter 2 that in the prefect situation of p11 = 1, the tomographic protocol
will always give Alice and Bob perfectly anticorrelated sets of keys. In non-ideal situations
however, errors will arise so that their keys will no longer be perfectly anticorrelated.
To strengthen the correlation between their keys, Alice and Bob can perform AD by follow-
ing the series of steps: They first divide their respective keys into blocks of length L. For
each L-block, Alice rolls a 2-sided die. She adds (modulo 2) the value obtained to each bit
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entry in her block. After that, she sends the processed block to Bob via a classical channel.
Bob then subtracts (modulo 2) his corresponding L-block from Alice’s processed block and
examine the resulting string of bits.
If Bob ends up with a string of identical bits, he will accept that bit value into his distilled
key sequence. He then communicates his decision to Alice so that she also enters the value
she has rolled into her own set of distilled bits. This situation occurs when Alice and Bob
• start off with raw blocks that are perfectly anticorrelated, ie. blocks that differ by a
constant shift, or
• start with identical raw blocks.
However, if any of the bits in Bob’s subtracted sequence is different from the rest, he will
reject that particular block and communicate his decision to Alice; she will likewise reject
the bit value she had rolled for that block.
The protocol is summarized in Fig. 4.1
4.1.1 Probabilities
For those accepted blocks, we can identify two cases:
(I) Alice and Bob end up with different distilled bits. In this case, the raw blocks that they
start out with must have been the perfectly anticorrelated;
(II) Alice and Bob end up with the same distilled bit. In this case, they start out with
identical raw blocks.
Since Alice and Bob aim to establish anticorrelated sets of keys, Case (II) would give rise
to errors in the distilled key sequence. Let us consider the rate at which the cases occur.
For large L, the Law of Large Numbers tells us that there will be approximately L3 bits in the
good block that result from Alice and Bob’s z basis measurement. For the σz measurement,
p
(z)
1 is the probability that Alice and Bob obtain anti-correlated results while p
(z)
0 is the
probability that they obtain correlated results. Similarly, L3 bits will result from y (x) basis
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0   1   1   0 1   0   1   0
0   0   1   1 ……1   0   0   1 0   1   0   1
Sent to Bob
0   0   1   1 ……1   0   0   1 0   1   0   1
0   0   1   1 ……1   0   0   1 0   1   0   0Bob








Figure 4.1: AD protocol for L = 4. Suppose Alice and Bob start out with the anticorrelated
raw key sequences “0110” and “1001” respectively. Alice rolls the value ‘1’, adds it to each
entry in her block and obtains the processed sequence “1001”. She sends this block over
a classical channel to Bob who, after subtracting his block, obtains the distilled sequence
“0000”. Since all bits are the same, he will accept ‘0’ into his distilled key sequence and
communicate his decision to accept the nit to Alice. Alice will then keep her rolled value
‘1’. Alice and Bob thus end up with the anticorrelated distilled bits. Similarly if Alice and
Bob start out with the same raw key sequence, they will end up with the same distilled bit.
On the other hand, if any bit in Bob’s subtracted sequence is different from all others, he
will reject that particular block and communicate his decision to Alice; she will likewise
reject that particular block.
measurement, and p(y)1 (p(x)1 ) is the probability that Alice and Bob obtain anti-correlated
results while p(y)0 (p(x)0 ) is the probability that they obtain correlated results. Thus for an















































. The error rate for Alice and









































For large L we have EAB → 0 so that the error rate in Alice’s and Bob’s distilled key de-
creases and their distilled key becomes perfectly anticorrelated as the block length becomes
large.
In the case of Eve, it is possible for her to intercept the processed blocks that Alice sends
to Bob via the classical channel. She can also eavesdrop on their communication to find
out which of the blocks are accepted or rejected. For those accepted blocks, her goal is
to deduce the distilled bit for each block. We shall consider two strategies at her disposal:
incoherent and coherent attacks.
4.2 Incoherent Attack on AD
For each raw block of length L, Eve has in her possession ancillas corresponding to each
of Alice and Bob’s measurements that give rise to the block. In an incoherent attack, she
distinguishes those ancillas one by one to deduce Alice and Bob’s bit values for each entry
in the raw block. Like Bob, she will then subtract Alice’s processed block from her own
to obtain the distilled bit∗. Typically, Eve’s block will be inhomogeneous after subtraction
so she decides by majority voting which bit value to assign to a particular block, i.e. she
chooses the value which occurs most frequently in her subtracted block, and if there are
the same number of 0s as 1s, she picks one of them at random. To obtain the condition for
AD to be successful under an incoherent attack by Eve, we will compare Eve’s error rate to
Alice and Bob’s error rate EAB derived earlier.
Consider first the Case (I) blocks. For this case, Alice and Bob start out with anticorre-
lated raw blocks. Eve’s corresponding ancillas will then reside in the a = 1 subspace. To
distinguish the individual ancillas, we assume that Eve performs a square-root measure-
ment on each of them as such a measurement gives her the least probability of error in her
∗Eve is able to intercept Alice’s block as it is transmitted over a classical channel.
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state discrimination. Eve thus guesses each entry in a block correctly with the following
probabilities:
• η(x)1 if Alice and Bob measure in the x basis;
• η(y)1 if they measure in the y basis;
• η(z)1 if they measure in the z-basis,
while she guesses an entry incorrectly with the probabilities
• 1− η(x)1 if Alice and Bob measure in the x basis;
• 1− η(y)1 if they measure in the y basis;
• 1− η(z)1 if they measure in the z-basis.
Since Eve applies majority voting, she will assign the wrong distilled bit whenever she
guesses more than half of the entries in the block wrongly. If the same number of 0s and 1s
appear in her guesses, she picks one of them at random and makes errors half of the time.
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 (1− η(z)1 )ez(η(z)1 )L3−ez , (4.3)
where ei is the number of errors made in the ith basis. The second summation arises from
the situation when Eve has to assign 0 or 1 at random to the block in the event that the
number of 0s and 1s in the block are equal.


















 (1− η(z)1 )L6 (η(z)1 )L6 . (4.4)




















Similarly for Case (II) where Alice and Bob start out with correlated raw blocks, the error















The total error rate for Eve is thus given by












































Since p(Case I) goes to 1 while p(Case II) goes to 0 for large L, we can approximate













By comparing error rates [Maurer, 1993], we can obtain the condition for AD to be success-
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1 (1− η(x)1 )(1− η(y)1 )(1− η(z)1 ). (4.10)






























1 (1− η(z)1 ). (4.11)
A similar result was obtained in [Brußet al., 2003].
4.3 Coherent Attack on AD
As pointed out before in Chapter 2, the tomography requirement of Alice and Bob ensures
that Eve cannot prepare a state that would give her some additional correlations across
different qubit pairs as such correlations would appear in Alice and Bob’s data and can
be picked up by them. This considerably reduces the number of coherent eavesdropping
strategies Eve can use. In fact, the only possibility of a coherent attack for Eve is to collect
her ancillas and perform some collective measurements on them. We shall consider such
attacks in this section. To illustrate the possible advantages that such coherent attacks have
over incoherent ones, we shall make use of a particularly simple scheme of attack that was
presented in [Kaszlikowski et al., 2003]. Instead of measuring her set of L ancillas one-
by-one as in an incoherent attack, Eve will perform a collective measurement on all the
L ancillas. It will be shown that by further eavesdropping on the communication between
Alice and Bob during the distillation process, Eve will be able to learn much more about
the distilled bit than if she were to measure her ancillas one by one.
Consider first a Case (I) block. As an example, suppose that Alice and Bob start out with
the blocks ‘0110’ and ‘1001’ respectively for L = 4, and that Alice’s random bit is 1.
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After addition (modulo 2), she sends the processed block ‘1001’ to Bob via a classical
channel. Eve is able to intercept this piece of information. Furthermore, she can project
her corresponding block of ancilla states into the appropriate a-subspace corresponding to
Alice and Bob having a correlated or anticorrelated block. Doing this, she knows that Alice
and Bob start out with anticorrelated raw blocks (i.e. Case (I) blocks). Eve then proceeds to
deduce the following possibilities:
1. If Alice’s random bit is ‘0’ (and since the intercepted processed block is ‘1001’),
Alice and Bob must have started out with raw blocks ‘1001’ and ‘0110’ respectively.
Furthermore, by by eavesdropping on the information exchanged during the basis
reconciliation stage, Eve knows the bases that Alice and Bob used for each entry
in the block. Suppose Alice and Bob had measured in the bases x, y, x, z for the
respective entries in the block. The corresponding ancilla state that she holds in this
case will then be |fx11〉|fy10〉|fx10〉|fz11〉.
2. If Alice’s random bit is ‘1’, Alice and Bob must have started out with raw blocks
‘0110’ and ‘1001’ respectively. If the measurement bases had been x, y, x, z respec-
tively, the ancilla state that Eve holds will then be |fx10〉|fy11〉|fx11〉|fz10〉.












1 . The optimal measurement to distinguish these two equiprobable states is
















In general, for each Case (I) block of length L, Eve needs to distinguish just two equiprob-





. In contrast for an
incoherent strategy, Eve would have 2L possible states to distinguish, which scales expo-
nentially with block length L.
Now, for large L, we have nx, ny, nz ≈ L3 . Eve’s probability of correctly inferring a partic-
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For large L, this error rate goes to 0 because Eve’s L-ancilla states approach orthogonality
with increasing L. Contrast this with the incoherent case where Eve’s ancillas does not
become easier to distinguish with increasing L.
For Case (II) blocks, we can invoke a similar argument and arrive at the corresponding













As before, Eve’s total error rate is given by















































To determine those Bell diagonal sates for which AD can be successfully carried out to give
Alice and Bob a secure set of key, we can fix p11 as before and parameterize the remaining
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probabilities as follows
p00 = (1− p11) cos2 θ cos2 φ
p01 = (1− p11) sin2 θ cos2 φ
p10 = (1− p11) sin2 φ. (4.17)
4.4.1 Coherent vs Incoherent Attack
For an incoherent attack on AD, we can use Eq. (4.10) to verify numerically that AD is
successful as long as p11 > 12 . This result was in fact proven in [Acı´n et al., 2003].
On the other hand, if Eve carries out a coherent attack, we can see from Fig. 4.2 that certain
states which are secure under an incoherent attack will no longer be so when Eve carries out
coherent eavesdropping. This is because coherent attacks can provide Eve with a lot more
information than an incoherent one, thereby causing certain states which are secure under
incoherent eavesdropping to become insecure under the coherent attack. Coherent attacks
are thus more powerful than incoherent ones.
In addition, we can notice certain states that remain secure under both coherent and inco-
herent attacks (as long as p11 > 12). These are the rank 2 resistant states that were seen
in Chapter 2 to be unconditionally secure (in certain bases) regardless of the kind of attack























































































































































































































































4.4.2 Quantum and Classical Distillation Are Not Equivalent
The criteria for AD and ED to be successful are summarized below
ED : p11 >
1
2
AD (incoherent attack) : p11 > 12






























If Eve is restricted only to incoherent attacks, we see that ED is equivalent to AD. As long
as p11 >
1
2 , Alice and Bob do not need ED because AD works equally well and does not
require the collective operations on qubits that ED requires and which are difficult to realize
experimentally.
However, if Eve is capable of carrying out a coherent attack, ED will be more powerful than
AD because ED is effective over a larger set of Bell diagonal states than AD. This can be
seen from Fig. 4.2 where more and more states fall into the black regions where AD fails
and only ED is possible, as p11 approaches 12 .
Although we have considered only two specific protocols to illustrate the inequivalence of
the classical and quantum methods of key distillation, argument along a similar line can be
applied to other distillation protocols (see for example the parity check protocol presented
in [Kaszlikowski et al., 2004]). We thus conclude that classical methods of secure key
distillation are less effective than quantum entanglement distillation protocols if an eaves-
dropper performs a coherent measurement on many quantum ancilla states simultaneously.




Cryptography with a Quantum Dot
Single Photon Source
In the final part of this thesis, the practical aspect of QKD will be considered. Experimental
quantum cryptography is a sufficiently advanced field so that there is already the possibility
for commercialization of some of the QKD devices. However, security analysis of such
generic devices is not always straightforward.
Recently, there was a scheme proposed by Fattal et al. [Fattal et al., 2004] to generate
polarization entangled photons by pulsed laser excitation of a single quantum dot. Such a
method has the advantage of producing entangled photons that are triggered on demand and
is particularly suitable as a source of photons in quantum cryptography schemes based on
shared entanglement such as the Ekert91 and BBM92. In this chapter, we apply this scheme
as a source of photons for our tomographic protocol and analyze its security.
5.1 Setup
The whole idea behind Fattal’s scheme lies in generating triggered single photons from
a quantum dot, using a method proposed by Santori et al. [Santori et al., 2001]. Such
a method involves pulsed optical excitation of a single quantum dot followed by spectral
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2 ns
+ 2 ns 
delay
Figure 5.1: Experimental setup: Single photons produced in pairs separated by 2ns from
a quantum dot microcavity device are sent through a single mode fiber and have their po-
larization rotated to H . They are split by a nonpolarizing beamsplitter (NPBS 1). The
polarization is changed to V in the longer arm of the Mach-Zehnder configuration. The two
paths of the interferometer merge at a second nonpolarizing beamsplitter (NPBS 2). One
time out of four, the first emitted photon takes the long path while the second photon takes
the short path, in which case their wave functions overlap at NPBS2. The output modes of
NPBS 2 are matched to single mode (SM) fibers for subsequent detection. The detectors
are linked to a time-to-amplitude converter for a record of coincidence counts, effectively
implementing the post-selection.
filtering to remove all but the last emitted photons. The main advantages of this method are
that multiphoton pulses can be suppressed and it allows one to generate consecutively two
photons that are quantum mechanically indistinguishable.
This idea of obtaining triggered single photons can be extended to a scheme for producing
polarization-entangled photons by incorporating it into the setup shown in Fig. 5.1. Suppose
we wish to produce polarization-entangled photons in the singlet state:
|z11〉 = |z0, z1〉 − |z1, z0〉, (5.1)
where the ‘0’ and ‘1’ stand for horizontal and vertical polarization respectively. In the setup,
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triggered photons are generated in pairs from the single-photon source using laser pulses.
The photon pairs are then sent through a Mach-Zehnder type interferometer setup. The idea
is to “collide” these photons with orthogonal polarizations at two conjugated input ports
of a nonpolarizing beam splitter (NPBS). Quantum interference effect ensures that photons
simultaneously detected at different output ports of the NPBS will ideally be entangled in
the form Eq. (5.1).
This method of generating entangled photons has the particular advantage of allowing the
users to generate entangled photons on demand and is particularly suitable as a source of
photons in quantum cryptography schemes based on shared entanglement. Let us apply
this scheme as a source of entangled qubits for our Tomographic QKD protocol. The aim
here is to analyze the security of the protocol based on this scheme of generating entangled
photons, thereby obtaining some useful results that could also be applied to other QKD
schemes based on such a photon source.
Due to imperfections in the experimental setup, the two-photon state produced from the
source is not a pure singlet state in general, but will instead be of the following form in the






β1 + β2 + 2γ β1 − β2

































The significance of the experimentally accessible parameters R, T , V and g is as follows:
R (T ) denotes the reflectivity (transmittivity) of the beamsplitters in the Mach-Zehnder
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interferometer used in the experiment. The parameter V denotes the overlap of the wave
packets of two consecutive photons that give rise to coincidence events in the experiment,
and g is the equal time second-order correlation function, and is related to the probability of
obtaining unwanted coincidence counts due to residual two-photon pulses from the quantum
dot. In the ideal situation, we have R = T (perfect beamsplitters), V = 1 and g = 0.
Furthermore, in order for entanglement to exist in the two photon state, we require V > 2g
from the Peres-Horodecki Partial Transposition criterion (see Chapter 3).






ωkb|mk mk+a〉 (where ω = −1) denotes the Bell state in the mth basis





















for the z, y and x Bell state representation respectively.
From their state tomography, Alice and Bob can make sure that their two-photon state is
always in the form Eq. (5.4). Furthermore, they can determine the parameters RT , g and
V that affect the security of their key. From these parameters, they can compute, for each
basis, the maximal strength of correlations between Eve and any one of them. The Csisza´r-
Ko¨rner theorem then guarantees that if the correlations between Alice and Bob are stronger
than those between Eve and either of them, a secure key can be established through one-
way error correcting codes, with efficiency given by the CK yield. For each basis, there is
a CK yield for Alice and Bob’s bit data, and they can find out which basis will give them
a positive CK yield. They will then make use of data only from those bases with positive
yield to establish their key, rejecting the bits obtained from the remaining measurements.
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5.2 Eavesdropping
We now consider Eve’s attack on the protocol. As before, we assume the worst-case sce-
nario in which she is in full control of the photon-distributing source, and that all the factors
that contribute to experimental imperfections (parameters R, T, g and V ) are due to her
eavesdropping activities.
In order to obtain as much information as possible about the key generated by Alice and














 δa,a′δb,b′ , if a = 0;δa,a′(1− δb,b′) γ√β1β2 + δa,a′δb,b′ , if a = 1.
(5.6)
Tracing out Eve’s degree of freedom in |ψABE〉〈ψABE | gives the mixed state Eq. (5.4) that
Alice and Bob expect, and this purification is the most general one as far as eavesdropping
is concerned. As before, we note that because of the tomography requirement of Alice and
Bob, Eve cannot prepare a state that would give her some additional correlations across
different photon pairs emitted by the source as such correlations would appear in Alice and
Bob’s data and can be picked up by them (we assume that they look out for such correlations
in their state tomography). This considerably reduces the number of coherent eavesdropping
strategies Eve can use. The only possibility of a coherent attack for Eve is to collect her
ancillas and perform some collective measurements on them. We shall only consider here
the case where Eve measures her ancillas one by one, although the treatment of a strategy
based on collective measurements can be done using the approach presented in Chapter 4.
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ak |xk, xk+a〉|fxak〉, (5.7)
where the normalization constants µ(m)ak are given by
µ
(z)
ak = δa,0α+ δa,1
[













The ancilla states have the following inner product
〈fza′k′ |fzak〉 =

δk,k′ , if a = a′ = 0,
δk,k′ + (1− δk,k′) β1−β2√
(β1+β2)2−4γ2
,
if a = a′ = 1,
0, if a 6= a′.
〈fxa′k′ |fxak〉 = 〈fya′k′ |fyak〉
=

δk,k′ + (1− δk,k′)α−β1α+β1 , if a = a′ = 0;





, if a 6= a′.
(5.9)
Eve’s strategy is then as follows. After the basis reconciliation stage, Eve knows which
pairs of photons contribute to the key and the basis that each pair was measured in. Her








As pointed out in Chapter 2, this can be viewed as a transmission of information from Alice
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and Bob to Eve encoded in the quantum state of Eve’s ancilla and the optimal eavesdrop-
ping strategy is one which maximizes this information transfer through a suitable Positive
Operator Valued Measure (POVM) [Davies, 1976]. This maximum information that can be
extracted by Eve is known as the accessible information.
5.3 Optimal POVM
In this section, the optimal POVM that achieves the accessible information will be pre-
sented. Due to the asymmetric nature of the bases, the optimal POVM is different for the z
and x/y bases. The optimality of these POVMs was deduced, and confirmed numerically,
using the algorithms presented in [Willeboordse, 2005] and [Reha´cek et al., 2004].
5.3.1 z Basis







where the kets have the structure given in Eq. (5.9). Ancillas from the correlation subspace
(a = 0) are orthogonal to all other states; those from the anticorrelation subspace (a = 1)
are in general non-orthogonal among themselves.
In the first step, Eve sorts the mixture of the ancillas into two sub-ensembles according to
the parity index a. This is done using a projective measurement. After that, depending on





















which she can distinguish perfectly.



















For simplicity, we shall denote the inner product 〈fz10|fz11〉 by λ ≡ β1−β2√(β1+β2)2−4γ2 .
Now, if the states |fz10〉, |fz11〉 in Eq. (5.14) are equiprobable (which happens if γ = 0, or
R = T ), the optimal measurement for Eve would be the square-root measurement (see
Chapter 2). Its POVM is given by {|ω10〉〈ω10|, |ω11〉〈ω11|}, where














with η = 12(1 +
√
1− λ2) being the probability of determining a given state correctly.
In general, the ancilla states will not occur with the same probability, and the optimal mea-
surement for Eve will then not be the square-root measurement. Consider the following
POVM {|ω˜10〉〈ω˜10|, |ω˜11〉〈ω˜11|}, where the states
|ω˜10〉 = cos θ|ω10〉 − sin θ|ω11〉
|ω˜11〉 = sin θ|ω10〉+ cos θ|ω11〉 (5.16)
are rotated from the square-root measurement states {|ω10〉, |ω11〉} by an angle θ (see
Fig. 5.2). We then have the following conditional probabilities
p(ω˜10|fz10) =
(√
η cos θ −
√




η sin θ +
√


















Figure 5.2: Rotated square-root measurement.
where, for instance, p(ω˜10|fz11) denotes the probability of getting the result of measurement
|ω˜10〉〈ω˜10| provided the state |fz11〉 was sent.
Using the probabilities in Eq. (5.17), we can compute the mutual information between Alice
and Eve as a function of θ. The optimal measurement for Eve then corresponds to the θ that
maximizes the mutual information between her and Alice. Due to the symmetric nature of
the protocol, the mutual information between Eve and Bob is the same as that between Eve
and Alice.
5.3.2 x/y Basis
Because the ancilla structure in the x and y bases are identical, we shall only consider what
happens when Eve receives ancillas from the x basis.
If Alice measured bit ‘0’ (k = 0, with probability 12 ), Eve will obtain the mixed state
ρxk=0 = (α+ β1)|fx00〉〈fx00|+ (α+ β2)|fx10〉〈fx10|, (5.18)
and if Alice measured ‘1’ (k = 1, with probability 12 ), Eve will obtain the state
ρxk=1 = (α+ β1)|fx01〉〈fx01|+ (α+ β2)|fx11〉〈fx11|. (5.19)
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′ ≡ µωk+k′ . (5.20)
























[κ+ (|fx00〉 − |fx01〉) + ² (|fx10〉 − |fx11〉)]
|g3〉 = 1√
N3
[κ− (|fx00〉 − |fx01〉) + ² (|fx10〉 − |fx11〉)] ,
(5.22)
where
κ± = β2 − β1 ±
√






The normalization constants Nk (k = 0, 1, 2, 3) read
N0 = 2(1 + λ0)





























If we now adopt {|g0〉, |g1〉, |g2〉, |g3〉} as an orthonormal set of basis, the optimal measure-
ment for Eve can be expressed as {|Ω0〉〈Ω0|, |Ω1〉〈Ω1|, |Ω2〉〈Ω2|, |Ω3〉〈Ω3|}, where
(|Ω0〉, |Ω1〉, |Ω2〉, |Ω3〉) = (|g0〉, |g1〉, |g2〉, |g3〉)

−a a b b
b −b a a
c c −d d
d d c −c
 ,
(5.25)
with a, b, c and d being real. By requiring that the measurement operators to sum to unity∑3
k=0 |Ωk〉〈Ωk| = 1, we have the following relations between the four real parameters:
a2 + b2 =
1
2




As before, we can compute the mutual information between Alice and Eve for this basis and
maximize it over the two independent variables a and c to obtain the maximum information
that Eve can obtain about Alice’s measurement.
5.4 Discussion
By determining the experimental parameters RT , g and V from state tomography, Alice
and Bob can determine the maximal mutual information of Eve and compute the yield in
the various bases to find out if the particular two-photon state they are receiving is secure
against incoherent attacks. Table 5.1 shows the values of mutual information for various
values of g and V . The ratio RT was fixed at 1.1 (the value reported in [Fattal et al., 2004]).
For certain values of g and V , the CK yield (denoted as νm, for the mth basis) is zero in
all measurement bases. For such states one cannot extract secure bits from the CK theorem.
More interesting are the cases where the CK yield is zero in one measurement basis and
positive in another. In such cases, Alice and Bob reject the data obtained by measurements
in the basis with zero yield and process only the data from the basis for which the CK yield
is positive. Finally, in the case where all the CK yields are positive, Alice and Bob use the
data from all the bases. The average CK yield in every case is given by ν = 13(νx+νy+νz).
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z basis x/y basis
g V IAB max IAE νz IAB max IAE νx,y ν
0.1 0.6 0.3478 0.6070 0 0.1872 0.4320 0 0
0.02 0.4 0.7598 0.7550 0.0048 0.1085 0.1088 0 0.0016
0.1 0.84 0.3478 0.3528 0 0.3869 0.3755 0.0114 0.0076
0.1 0.9 0.3478 0.2845 0.0633 0.4525 0.3321 0.1204 0.1014
Table 5.1: Table of yields in the three bases for RT = 1.1, and different values of g and V .
Due to the asymmetric nature of the state in the z and x/y bases, the yield is different for
those bases. The yield is the same in the x and y bases.
5.4.1 Perfect Beamsplitters
Of particular interest is the case when we have perfect beamsplitters (RT = 1). The state
produced by the source is then in a Bell diagonal form:
α|z00〉〈z00|+ α|z01〉〈z01|+ β1|z10〉〈z10|+ β2|z11〉〈z11|.
The security of such states was analyzed in Chapter 2 and the results can be applied to this
situation.
In Fig. 5.3 the average CK yield is plotted against g and V . We observe that the protocol
is always secure against incoherent attacks as long as g = 0 and V > 0, although fewer
secure bits can be distilled for smaller V . In fact, the state for which g = 0 corresponds to
one of the rank 2 Bell diagonal resistant states that was identified in Section 2.2.5:
β1|z10〉〈z10|+ β2|z11〉〈z11|.
More detailed analysis reveals that for such states, the mutual information between Alice
and Eve is always zero when Alice and Bob perform measurements in the x or y basis.
This is due to the fact that Eve’s ancillas corresponding to different outcomes of Alice’s
measurements in the x and y bases are the same, i.e. they do not carry any information
whatsoever about Alice’s and Bob’s correlations. Therefore, if Alice and Bob agree on
using only the data from the x and y measurements (thereby sacrificing the efficiency), the
protocol becomes secure against all possible attacks by Eve and the protocol guarantees
unconditional security. For g, V = 0, the state becomes separable and no secure bits can be
extracted.
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In realistic situations however, the value of g can be small but not exactly zero (for example,
the value of g reported in [Santori et al., 2001] was 0.02). In this case, the protocol is secure
over a smaller range of V . Even then, it is reasonable to conjecture that the information that
Eve can extract from her ancillas in the x or y basis is negligible, and the protocol remains

































































































































































































































So far, we have excluded the effects of noise in the channel so that Alice and Bob expect to
receive the state ‘as-is’ from the source. In reality however, this is not the case: Alice and
Bob would expect their quantum channel to be affected by interactions with the environment
so that the state they receive contains some noise. Let us consider what happens when there
is symmetric white noise present in the channel, i.e. the state that Alice and Bob expect to






β1 + β2 + 2γ β1 − β2






where the parameter F gives the amount of unbiased noise admixed to the original state
from the source. We have 0 ≤ F ≤ 1, where F = 0 corresponds to the absence of noise in
the quantum channel while F = 1 refers to the situation of a completely noisy channel.
Detailed analysis shows that the situation is similar to that for the noiseless case, with the
following substitutions made:
α −→ (1− F )α+ F
4
β1 −→ (1− F )β1 + F4
β2 −→ (1− F )β2 + F4
γ −→ (1− F )γ. (5.28)




ak = δa,0(1− F )α+ δa,1(1− F )
[









ak = δa,0(1− F )
α+ β1
2















Figure 5.4: Average CK yield for RT = 1.1 and g = 0.02 and different amounts of noise
in the channel F . For a noiseless channel (F = 0), when V . 0.394, one can no longer
extract secure bits by means of one-way communication because the CK yield is zero. As
the amount of noise increases, the CK yield drops until for F & 0.277, where we will not
be able to distill any secure bits at all (because the CK yield is 0 for all values of V ).
〈fza′k′ |fzak〉 =

δk,k′ , if a = a′ = 0,





if a = a′ = 1,
0, if a 6= a′.
〈fxa′k′ |fxak〉 = 〈fya′k′ |fyak〉
=

δk,k′ + (1− δk,k′) α−β1α+β1+ F2(1−F ) , if a = a
′ = 0;










]ωk+k′ , if a 6= a′.
(5.30)
The optimal POVM for Eve is thus of the same form as before, and we can obtain the
condition for security and the CK yield for various proportions of noise. This is shown
in Fig. 5.4, for fixed values of RT = 1.1 and g = 0.02 (values reported in [Fattal et al.,




In this thesis, a generalized tomographic QKD scheme applicable to Bell diagonal states
was presented and its resistance to various eavesdropping attacks was analyzed, both in the
CK regime and when Alice and Bob perform distillation. The inequivalence of advantage
distillation and entanglement distillation in the situation of a coherent attack by an eaves-
dropper was also shown. Furthermore, certain states that offer unconditional security were
identified. These are the rank 2 Bell diagonal states.
The security of the tomographic protocol using a source of entangled photons produced in
the experimental scheme proposed by Fattal et al. [Fattal et al., 2004] was also analyzed
against the most general incoherent attack. From the analysis, the number of secure bits that
can be distilled by means of one-way communication between Alice and Bob can be given
as a function of the experimentally accessible parameters R, T , g and V , and for different
degrees of unbiased noise in the channel F . A number of useful observations from the
analysis, such as the unconditional security of rank 2 Bell diagonal states and the security
of states with small values of g, could also be applied to other QKD schemes based on such
a photon source.
The tomographic protocol that was considered here admits noise of a few specific form,
ie. we have considered states of the form Eqs. (2.10) and (5.27). Experimentally, noise
may be of a more general nature, so that a more detailed analysis than the one presented is
required. Characterization of these actual states in QKD may change the noise bounds for




Here, it will be shown that Alice and Bob can determine the exact state of their two-qubit
source by comparing their respective data for the tomographically complete set of measure-
ments {σx, σy, σz}.
The most general two-qubit state % is completely characterized by 15 real parameters, and




















where the parameters ak, bk, and Tkl (k, l = 1, 2, 3) are all real, and we have denoted σx, σy
and σz by σ1, σ2 and σ3 respectively. By noting that σiσj = δij + i²ijkσk, we have the




















σAi ⊗ σBj %
]
= Tij . (A.2)
Alice and Bob can thus deduce all the 15 values of the parameters characterizing their state
from the average values of their basis measurements.
∗Here the Levi-Cevita symbol ²ijk takes values 1 if the indices i, j, k are an even permutation of 1, 2, 3, -1




Here, a few properties about state measurements on quantum systems will be mentioned.
B.1 Generalized Measurements
Consider a quantum system initially prepared in the state whose density operator is ρ. A
measurement operation ρ → L(ρ) is carried out on the system. This measurement has n
distinguishable outcomes, labeled as ωk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, with corresponding final
density operators ρ′k. The quantum detection operators Πk corresponding to each result ωk
is such that the probability of obtaining ωk given the initial state ρ is
p(ωk|ρ) = Tr [ρΠk] . (B.1)
For a pure state, ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, so that this probability is simply
p(ωk|ψ) = 〈ψ|Πk|ψ〉. (B.2)
We demand a few properties of Πk:
1. Since the probabilities (B.1) must be non-negative for all states ρ, this implies
〈ψ|Πk|ψ〉 ≥ 0, (B.3)
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for all pure states |ψ〉. Hence, all the Πk’s must be positive (semi-definite):
Πk ≥ 0, (B.4)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
A few consequences follow from this property:
(a) Since 〈ψ|Πk|ψ〉 must be real for all states |ψ〉, i.e.
〈ψ|Πk|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|Πk|ψ〉∗ = 〈ψ|Π†k|ψ〉, (B.5)
each Πk must be Hermitian.
(b) Since 〈ψ|Πk|ψ〉 ≥ 0 for all |ψ〉, we can take |ψ〉 to be one of the (orthonormal)
eigenkets of Πk, so that the eigenvalues of each Πk must be non-negative.
2. The probabilities (B.1) must sum to 1 for all states ρ. It follows that the Πk form a
resolution of the identity:
n−1∑
k=0
Πk = 1. (B.6)
The conditions above are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the realisability of an
experiment whose outcomes have the probability distribution p(ωk|ρ) [Kraus, 1983]. Such
a set of detection operator is commonly known as a Positive Operator Valued Measure
(POVM).




so that Πk = M †kMk. This is always possible from the positivity of Πk. Then the density








] = MkρM †k
p(ωk|ρ) . (B.8)
The presence of the probability in the denominator serves to normalize the state, so that
Tr [ρ′k] = 1. If we do not record the result of the measurement, then the final density op-
erator ρ′ is given by a distribution of the density operators ρk corresponding to the possible
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We show that it is not possible to reliably distinguish between two non-orthogonal states.
Suppose we wish to distinguish with certainty the non-orthogonal states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉. To
do this, we make use of a set of measuring operators {Mm}2m=1, and require that
p(1||ψ1〉) = 〈ψ1|M †1M1|ψ1〉 = 1 (B.10)
p(2||ψ2〉) = 〈ψ2|M †2M2|ψ2〉 = 1 (B.11)
p(1||ψ2〉) = 〈ψ2|M †1M1|ψ2〉 = 0 (B.12)
p(2||ψ1〉) = 〈ψ1|M †2M2|ψ1〉 = 0. (B.13)
(B.12) and (B.13) imply that
M2|ψ1〉 = 0 (B.14)
M1|ψ2〉 = 0 (B.15)
Since the Mm’s form a valid set of measuring operators, they resolve the identity:
M †1M1 +M
†
2M2 = 1, (B.16)
so that
〈ψ1|M †1M1|ψ2〉+ 〈ψ1|M †2M2|ψ2〉 = 〈ψ1|ψ2〉. (B.17)
Invoking (B.14) and (B.15), we have
〈ψ1|ψ2〉 = 0, (B.18)
a contradiction, since |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are non-orthogonal. We have thus proven that it is not
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possible to distinguish between non-orthogonal states reliably.
On the other hand, if |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 were orthogonal states, we can distinguish among them
unambiguously; the measuring operators are simply the orthogonal projectors, |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and
|ψ2〉〈ψ2|. Such a measurement is also known as a von Neumann measurement.
Note that if we allow the possibility of inconclusive results, we can in fact have error-free
discrimination amongst non-orthogonal states [Ivanovic, 1987; Helstrom, 1976].
B.3 Square-Root Measurement
Consider a set of n pure states {|ψj〉}j=0,1,...,n−1 occurring with equal a priori probabili-
ties, ηj = 1n . These states are also symmetric, in the sense that it satisfies the following
conditions:
|ψj〉 = U |ψj−1〉 = U j |ψ0〉
U |ψn−1〉 = |ψ0〉, (B.19)
for some unitary operator U . U transforms each state into its successor, and the final state
back to the original state. The optimum measurement which distinguishes these states with
minimum probability of error can be derived analytically and is known as the square-root






The optimum detection operators are then of the form
Πj = |ωj〉〈ωj |, (B.21)
where
|ωj〉 = Φ− 12 |ψj〉. (B.22)
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The |ωj〉’s are in general unnormalized and non-orthogonal. The Πj’s defined in this way
form a valid set of POVM’s:
1.
〈ψ|Πj |ψ〉 = |〈ωj |ψ〉|2 ≥ 0









2 |ψj〉〈ψj |Φ− 12 = Φ− 12ΦΦ− 12 = 1,
i.e. the Πj’s form a resolution of the identity.
For equally-probable symmetric states, this measurement then attains the minimum error
probability





∣∣∣〈ψj |Φ− 12 |ψj〉∣∣∣2 . (B.23)
It is because of the presence of theΦ− 12 in Πj that this measurement is known as the square-
root measurement.
Finally, we note that for orthogonal states, the square root measurement reduces to the
orthogonal projectors |ψj〉〈ψj |, so that square root measurement is indeed the most optimal




Here, we show the optimality of the measurement given in Section 2.2.3. Consider the
following quantum communication scenario: Alice sends N quantum states ρj to Eve with






Eve performs a positive-operator valued measurement (POVM) composed of K operators
{Πk}Kk=1 such that
Πk ≥ 0 (C.2)
K∑
k=1
Πk = 1. (C.3)
The POVM she chooses is such that the measurement gives her the maximum informa-












p(EA)jk = pkTr [Πjρk] (C.5)
64




p(EA)jk = Tr [Πjρ] (C.6)




p(EA)jk = pk (C.7)
















Eve’s choice of POVM is such that it maximizes the mutual information of Eq. (C.9). Con-




δΠk = 0. (C.10)




Tr [RjδΠj ] +
∑
j
Tr [ΠjδRj ] . (C.11)
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The second term vanishes, since
∑
j


















































Tr [RjδΠj ] . (C.13)























A†jδAj = 0. (C.16)




²jkAk, with ²†jk = −²kj , (C.17)














Now, an optimal POVM gives an extremum for Eq. (C.4) so that δIAE = 0. Furthermore,







ΠkRjΠj = ΠkRkΠj . (C.20)
In the case of the measurement given in Section 2.2.3, we have the following scenario: The
quantum channel between Alice and Eve is such that Alice sends the following equiprobable








p(m)a |f (m)a1 〉〈f (m)a1 |, (C.21)
where ρk is the state that Alice sends if she obtains the kth outcome in her measurement in
the mth basis. For the measurement described in Section 2.2.3, its POVM is characterized
by two indices a, k:
Πak = |ωmak〉〈ωmak|, (C.22)
such that









(δk,0 − δk,1)(δk′,0 − δk′,1)
 .
(C.23)














, if k = k′;
2λa log λa, otherwise
= Πa′k′Ra′k′Πak, (C.24)
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i.e. Eq. (C.20) is true for this POVM and so the measurement extremizes the information




Here we show intuitively how the mutual information can be used to quantify the amount
of correlation between two ensembles. For ease of discussion, we will be using log base 2
— the entropy and mutual information is then measured in bits.
We first define the Shannon entropy of an ensemble.
D.1 Shannon Entropy
Suppose we have a random variable X with n outcomes x1, x2, . . . , xn that we call letters.
These n letters together form an alphabet. The kth letter occurs with probability p(k), so
that
∑n




p(k) log2 p(k). (D.1)
We will now show that the entropy is the average number of bits per letter needed to describe
a message drawn from this alphabet of n letters.
Suppose that we construct a message of L letters chosen from our alphabet of n letters
{x1, x2, . . . , xn}, and that the letters in the message are statistically independent. For LÀ
1, the law of large numbers tells us that a typical string will contain Lp(k) xk’s. The
collection of all such typical strings form a typical sequence. The number of distinct typical
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strings in this sequence is
N =
 L
Lp(1), Lp(2), . . . , Lp(n)
 = L!
(Lp(1))!(Lp(2))! · · · (Lp(n))! . (D.2)
Using Stirling’s approximation log x! ≈ x log x− x for xÀ 1, we obtain











The number of typical strings is thus approximately
N ≈ 2LH(X). (D.4)
The Shannon enropy H(X) thus quantifies how much information is conveyed, on the av-
erage, by a letter drawn from the ensemble X , for it tells us how many bits are required
asymptotically as L → ∞ to encode that information: The optimal code will compress
each letter to H(X) bits asymptotically. This result is also known as Shannon’s noisless
coding theorem.
D.2 Mutual Information
The mutual information IXY quantifies how correlated two messages are, that is how much
do we know about a message drawn from the ensemble X⊗L ≡ X ⊗X · · · ⊗X when we
have read a message drawn from Y ⊗L.
For example, suppose Alice wishes to send Bob a message. However, the communication
channel is noisy so that the message received by Bob (y) might differ from the message sent
by Alice (x). The noisy channel can be characterised by the conditional probability that y
is received when x is sent, p(y|x). We also suppose that x is sent with a priori probability
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We wish to quantify how much Bob learns about x when he receives y, that is how much
information does he gain about x by measuring y?
Now, the entropy H(X) quantifies Bob’s a priori ignorance per letter, before any message is
received: He would require LH(X) bits to completely specify (asymptotically) a particular
message of L letters sent by Alice.
When Bob learns about the value of y, he becomes less ignorant about x than before. Given
the y’s that Bob receives, Alice can then, using an optimal code, specify a particular string
















= H(X,Y )−H(Y ) (D.6)
bits per letter. H(X|Y ) is the conditional entropy ofX given Y . We may interpretH(X|Y )
as the number of additional bits per letter needed to specify both x and y once y is known.
This quantity is non-negative.
Now, the information about X that Bob gains when he learns Y is quantified by how much
the number of bits per letter needed to specify X is reduced when Y is known. This is given
by
IXY ≡ H(X)−H(X|Y ) (D.7)
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) (D.8)









IXY is called the mutual information of X and Y . It is symmetric under interchange of X
and Y , IXY = IY X (we find out as much about X by learning Y as about Y by leaning
X) and non-negative (learning Y can never reduce our knowledge of X).
Since IXY quantifies the information gained about X on learning Y , we can also interpret
IXY as the amount of correlation between the two ensembles X and Y . For example, if X
and Y are uncorrelated, we have p(x, y) = p(x)p(y) so that using (D.10), so that
IXY = 0; (D.11)
we find out nothing about X by learning Y if there is no correlation.
The interpretation of IXY as the information gain aboutX on receiving Y is consistent with
the results of Shannon’s noisy channel coding theorem, where IXY is also the information
per letter that can be sent over a noisy channel.
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